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Abstract
This paper forecasts current senators’ votes on Merrick Garland’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the
unlikely case that a vote actually takes place. The forecasts are necessarily conditional, awaiting measurement of the
nominee’s characteristics. Nonetheless, a model that combines parameters estimated from existing data with values
of some measurable characteristics of senators—particularly their party affiliations, party loyalty levels, and ideological
positions—is sufficient to identify potential swing voters in the Senate. By accounting for a more nuanced and refined
understanding of the confirmation process, our model reveals that if President Obama were to nominate almost any
nominee (conservative or liberal) today, that nominee would be rejected if a vote was allowed to take place. So why
nominate anyone at all? Obama’s hope for a successful confirmation must come from the stochastic component, that is,
from outside the traditional decision-making calculus.
Keywords
Confirmations, party unity, forecasting

Introduction
On 13 February 2016, news broke that Supreme Court
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia had passed away following an afternoon of quail hunting at the Cibolo Creek Ranch
in Texas. On that very same day, even before flags nationwide could be lowered to half-staff, the Senate Majority
Leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, released a written
statement announcing that the Senate would not act on any
nomination by President Barack Obama. “This vacancy
should not be filled until we have a new president,” the
Republican senator declared.
McConnell’s resolve is being tested by Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland, but McConnell’s threatened
exercise of negative agenda power aims to preserve
Republican Party cohesion. Nominating an extremely
qualified and ideologically moderate nominee might
drive a wedge between the conservative and moderate
clusters of Republican senators. Senators facing difficult
re-election battles might be tempted to defect from the
party position if forced to vote, and so obstructing the
confirmation process shields these senators from a controversial choice.
A strategic explanation for McConnell’s actions, such as
the one in the last paragraph, depends on an implicit theory

of how senators decide whether to support or oppose a
Supreme Court nominee. This paper uses one such theory
to forecast current senators’ votes on Merrick Garland’s
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the unlikely case
that a vote actually takes place. The forecasts are necessarily conditional, awaiting measurement of the nominee’s
characteristics, particularly his ideological reputation and
perceived qualifications. Nonetheless, a model that combines parameters estimated from existing data with values
of some measurable characteristics of senators—particularly their party affiliations, party loyalty levels, and ideological “ideal points”—is sufficient to identify potential
swing voters in the Senate.
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Models of senators’ confirmation
voting behavior
Empirical studies of Supreme Court confirmation votes
have focused on explaining both confirmation outcomes
(cf. Segal, 1987; Segal and Spaeth, 2002) and senators’
votes on nominees (cf. Cameron et al., 1990; Epstein et al.,
2006; Segal et al., 1992). Let us consider two simplistic
models of senators’ confirmation voting behavior and one
more complicated model. We begin by describing each
model, then show how it performs on explaining senators’
voting behavior between the administrations of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and George W. Bush. Comparing the three models’ performance at predicting senators’ voting behavior for
Barack Obama’s first two nominees, Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan, reveals how the nominating process has
become more partisan, so that models that pay insufficient
attention to partisanship fit the current political environment poorly.
First, the “deferential” model would emphasize the unanimity that historically characterized the constitutional
Advice and Consent process. From Hugo Black in 1937 to
Thurgood Marshal in 1967, 22 consecutive nominees were
confirmed by the Senate.1 Senators cast 1906 yea votes in
total, versus just 83 nay votes; the average nominee received
96% of senators’ support. Over the long run the deferential
model was highly successful. From 1937 through 2007, a
period covering 12 presidents and 41 nominations, the deferential model correctly predicted 87.2% of votes.
Second, the “partisan” model would emphasize whether
an individual senator shares the president’s party affiliation. Over the 70-year span from 1937 to 2007, the partisan
model would have been successful on fewer than 63.9% of
senators’ votes.
Third, the “Segal” model has four explanatory variables: the president’s political strength, meaning that his
party holds a majority of seats in the Senate and that it is
not an election year; each senator’s party affiliation in relation to the president;2 the nominee’s reputation in terms of
qualifications;3 and the proximity of each senator’s ideological position to the nominee’s reputed perceived ideology.4 These four variables plus an interaction between
ideological proximity and qualifications form a model that
would have been successful on 90.2% of votes on nominees between 1937 and 2007.
So far, we have described the relative accuracy of these
three models in terms of in-sample validation, i.e. referring
back to the votes that were used to generate the model’s
parameters. A recent perspective holds that we should use
out-of-sample validation5 to judge models. King and Zeng
state, “We must regard models that make causal inferences
as also capable of forecasting. … Scholars would do well to
judge all models in terms of their forecasting prowess,
regardless of the purpose for which they were originally
developed” (2001: 634). An example of out-of-sample
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validation would be assessing how well each model would
fare at predicting senators’ votes on future nominees.
The deferential model and Segal model fared surprisingly
poorly in forecasting senators’ votes during the confirmations of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. Both nominees
were portrayed in the media as highly qualified, and Obama
was a “strong” president, as Democrats held the Senate’s
majority. If one used all nominees from Black through Alito
to estimate the parameters of the Segal model, and then used
those parameters to generate forecasts of votes on Sotomayor
and Kagan, the prediction would have been near unanimous
support among Republicans. In reality, 31 of 99 senators
opposed Sotomayor’s confirmation and 37 of 100 senators
opposed Kagan’s confirmation. Forecasting strict party-line
voting would have correctly predicted 92.5% of senators’
votes on Obama’s nominees, compared to just 65.5% for the
deferential model and 67.8% for the Segal model.6
When examining political phenomena that take place over
long spans of time, models must account for dynamics: “The
only way that forecasts can remain accurate far into the future
is if the causal structure giving rise to the data remain stable”
(King and Zeng, 2001: 634). A comparison of in-sample and
out-of-sample predictions suggests that consideration of
Supreme Court nominees has switched from a regime in
which the president’s nominee is presumed worthy of confirmation unless his or her reputation or ideological position
undermines that presumption, to a regime in which voting is
largely based on party considerations. Our challenges are to
explain the transition over time and to use that knowledge to
predict behavior on current and future nominees.

The partisan dynamic
Two recent articles on Supreme Court confirmations recognized the increased role of partisanship on senators’
votes. Shipan (2008) noted that while senators in the president’s party have always been more likely to support
nominees than senators in the opposing party, the gap
widened from less than 10% between Presidents Kennedy
and Ford, to nearly 20% when Reagan took office, and
then continued to grow. Shipan used a counter variable to
estimate the changing importance of party considerations,
so his model can be extrapolated indefinitely, but ultimately his analysis does not identify a theory of precisely
why partisanship has become more relevant to Supreme
Court confirmation voting.
Basinger and Mak (2012) argued that party cohesion
provides both a theoretical link missing from Shipan’s
approach and an empirical measure of how important partisan considerations are to senators.7 Legislative parties’
cohesion and partisanship in the electorate tend to be in
equilibrium: as parties’ brand names become more meaningful cues for voters, reinforcing those brand names
becomes more imperative to legislators. As party cohesion
rises, senators who belong to the president’s party should
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Table 1. Competing models of Supreme Court confirmation votes.

Constant
Strong president
Lack of qualifications
Ideological distance
Lack of qualifications × ideological distance
Opposing party
Average party loyalty
Average party loyalty × opposing party
Relative party loyalty
Relative party loyalty × opposing party
Pseudo R2
% correctly classified
% reduction in errors
AIC
BIC

Segal model

Party loyalty model

2.172 (.081)
0.354 (.062)
–1.012 (.165)
–1.186 (.155)
–4.926 (.667)
–0.681 (.070)

2.674 (.156)
0.967 (.089)
–1.508 (.226)
–1.365 (.210)
–4.508 (.660)
–1.168 (.131)
0.090 (.033)
–0.235 (.034)
0.034 (.003)
–0.045 (.005)
0.5223
92.7 %
47.6%
1554.54
1617.463

0.3636
89.1 %
21.1 %
2059.682
2097.446

AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
Note: Cell entries are probit coefficient (standard error).
Every coefficient is statistically significant at p < .01 (two-tailed).

be more likely to rally around the president’s nominees,
while senators who belong to the opposing party should be
increasingly likely to oppose nominees. Thus, rising levels
of average party cohesion explain the transition over time
from a deferential regime to a partisan regime.
Basinger and Mak (2012) also theorized that variations
within each party should be influenced by individual senators’ levels of party loyalty. Members of each party who are
more loyal than average will be more likely to adhere to
their party’s position, while “maverick” or independentminded senators will be more likely to defect. The most
loyal senators in the president’s party are most likely to
support the president’s nominee, and the most loyal senators in the opposing party are least likely to support the
nominee, all else being held equal.
Average party loyalty in a Congress and relative party
loyalty (measured as the deviation from the average in that
Congress) can be incorporated into empirical models as a
multiplicative interaction. We include each term separately
and in interaction with a dummy variable indicating
whether the senator shares the president’s party affiliation
or belongs to the opposition party.
To estimate the parameters of the party loyalty model, we
used all nominations in the dataset, from Hugo Black
through Elena Kagan, and utilized a probit regression model.
The party loyalty model’s estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in the second column of Table 1; for
comparison purposes, we also provide the Segal model estimates in the first column of Table 1. A positive coefficient
indicates that an increase in a variable’s value makes a yea
vote more likely, while a negative coefficient indicates the
opposing effect. Using either model, a senator was significantly more likely to vote for the nominee when

the president was in a strong political position and as the
nominee’s qualifications rose, and a senator was significantly less likely to vote for the nominee when the president
belonged to the other political party and as the nominee was
reputed to be further away in ideological space.
The party loyalty model adds two variables plus two
interaction terms: average party loyalty8 and relative party
loyalty9 are included by themselves and as interactions with
the opposing-party variable. The positive coefficient for
average party loyalty indicates that the likelihood of the
same-party senators supporting the president’s nominee
increases as the level of party unity rises. When we take
into account the interaction term (average party unity ×
opposing party), the likelihood of opposition party members voting for the nominee decreases as the level of party
unity rises. Thus, increasing cohesion leads to a widening
gap between “typical” members of two parties. Similar calculations can be carried out for relative party loyalty: more
loyal members of the president’s party are more likely to
support nominees while more loyal members of the opposing party are less likely to support nominees, all else equal.
The party loyalty model out-performs the Segal model
according to several measures of in-sample performance. The
party loyalty model predicts more senators’ votes correctly,
by a margin of nearly 93% versus 89%. Since the null model
classifies 86.2% correctly, the party loyalty model eliminates
more than twice as many erroneous classifications.
In the section titled “Models of senators’ confirmation
voting behavior,” we performed an out-of-sample analysis
of model fit to augment the in-sample analysis. We can
duplicate that analysis by using just the votes for Black
through Alito to estimate model parameters. The Segal
model’s in-sample correct classification statistic is 90.2%,
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Figure 1. Comparison of out-of-sample forecast errors.

compared to 92.6% for the party loyalty model. When these
model parameters were applied to predict votes on
Sotomayor and Kagan, the Segal model’s out-of-sample
correct classification statistic is 67.8% of votes, compared
to 94.0% for the party loyalty model.
To substantiate the predictive superiority of a model
which incorporates the changing importance of partisan
considerations in Senate voting, we generated out-of-sample forecasts for every nominee in the dataset using both the
Segal model and the party loyalty model. Figure 1 plots the
percent of incorrect predictions for each model. The two
track quite closely from Black through Breyer. After
Breyer’s confirmation vote in August 1994 (by an 87–9
margin), there was an 11-year gap until Justice Roberts was
confirmed in September 2005 (by a 78–22 margin). One
can clearly see that the Segal model begins to deviate from
the party loyalty model, with a far higher error rate for the
former, for the four most recent nominees.
In summary, incorporating the average level of Senate
parties’ cohesion and the relative loyalty of individual senators allows for more accurate predictions of senators’ votes
in-sample as well as out-of-sample. In what follows, we
will apply the party loyalty model to forecasting senators’
votes on the current nominee, Merrick Garland.

The known and the unknown
When generating forecasts, scholars rely on a few known
elements, and then make educated guesses to fill in

unknown elements. Senators’ party affiliations are known
when the election is final, and rarely change mid-session;
James Jeffords of Vermont and Arlen Spector of
Pennsylvania provide notable recent exceptions. Because
senators’ party affiliations are known and rarely change,
aggregate party affiliations can be computed, allowing the
president’s strength to be filled in; James Jeffords again
provides the notable exception.
The characteristics of individual senators, other than
their party affiliations, are also unknown but also can be
estimated. Ideological positions can be estimated using the
past voting behavior of individual senators (see Poole and
Rosenthal, 1997, 2007). We follow Basinger and Mak
(2012), who used the Common Space DW-NOMINATE
scores, which are estimates of a single ideal point for each
member of Congress for his or her entire record of service
in Congress, and which are updated weekly. The model’s
population parameters are unknown but can be estimated
using existing data.
Historically, individual senators’ party loyalty levels
were not calculated until the end of a Congress, but
Congressional Quarterly provided us with party loyalty
scores based on the 2015 term of the 114th Congress.10
Loyalty scores are calculated as the percent of the time that
senators joined their party majority on so-called “party
unity votes,” which are roll call votes on which majorities
of the two parties are on opposite sides.
Although Obama’s nominee is known, Merrick
Garland’s salient characteristics have not yet been

Basinger and Mak
measured. Segal and Cover (1989) pioneered the practice
of measuring nominees’ qualifications and ideological
position using newspaper editorials. Faced with incomplete
data, we can still make educated guesses and consider various alternative scenarios.

Conditional forecasts
Our forecast of senators’ votes are conditional statements,
of the form, “Suppose the nominee has qualifications Q
and ideological position N; then a senator with party affiliation P, party loyalty level L, and ideological position S
will vote for the nominee with probability Y, given the
president’s strength and the contemporaneous level of
party cohesion ( L).” Party affiliations for each senator (Pi)
are known; we assign values of ideological position (Si)
using Common Space first-dimension DW-NOMINATE
scores; we assign each senator’s party loyalty level (Li)
using scores for 2015; we calculate the average level of
party cohesion ( L = 91.9) and then calculate each senator’s relative loyalty as Li – L; we set the value of presidential strength equal to 0, since Democrats hold the
minority of seats in the Senate. We used the party loyalty
model to estimate the model’s parameters.11 In order to
compute Y, we need only insert values of Q and N.
As an illustration, consider two senators, the most conservative Democrat, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, and the
most liberal Republican, Susan Collins of Maine. These
senators’ Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores are –.07
and +.10, respectively, and their party loyalty levels are
both 63%, far below the average in the first term of the
114th Congress.
Suppose Merrick Garland’s qualifications are perceived as being as high as those of John Roberts (Q = .97).
If Garland’s ideological position was reputed to be at
Obama’s own ideal point (N = −.366 according to a recent
estimate by Lewis et al. (2016)), then one would calculate
the squared distance between that point and each senator’s
ideal point, and insert that value into the equation, and use
the standard normal cumulative distribution to generate a
predicted probability. Manchin’s probability of supporting a nominee with qualifications equal to Roberts and
Obama’s ideal point is 99.7%, while Collins’ predicted
probability is about 29.1%.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to anticipate that Obama would
select an extremely liberal nominee when the opposing
party controls the Senate. Moraski and Shipan (1999) theorized that the president and Senate would perceive that any
new appointment to the Supreme Court would move the
median justice; with eight sitting Justices, the feasible
range of the new median is between the 4th nominee (presently Breyer, at N = +.007) and the 5th nominee (presently
Kennedy, at N = +.106). Moraski and Shipan (1999) refer to
the current situation as a “Fully Constrained President,”
since the median senator’s ideal point, recently estimated at
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+.275, is on the opposite side of the Supreme Court median
from the president. If Obama nominated someone whose
ideological position was reputed to be identical to
Kennedy’s ideal point – which was the median prior to
Justice Scalia’s death – then Sen. Manchin’s probability of
supporting such a nominee increases marginally from
99.7% to 99.8%, while Sen. Collins’s probability increases
from 28.9% to about 40.9%.
For a wider set of senators, Table 2 shows the names,
Common Space scores, and party loyalty levels of the five
most conservative Democrats and the 17 most liberal
Republicans in the Senate. An asterisk after the name indicates that the senator is up for re-election in 2016, a condition which applies to 10 Republican senators shown in the
Table. Table 2 then shows the predicted probabilities of
supporting a hypothetical nominee with impeccable credentials and three different ideological positions: at
President Obama’s ideal point, at Justice Kennedy’s ideal
point, and at the median senator’s ideal point. Notice the
absence of probabilities above 50% among Republican
senators in any of the three conditions. Interestingly, our
model’s predictions shown in the middle column directly
contradict the expectation stated by Cameron and Kastellec:
“Obama should nominate the best confirmable nominee —
a Kennedy clone… — whom the Senate would approve.”
Figure 2 amplifies the seeming hopelessness of the
nomination by showing the predicted probabilities of all
current Republican senators voting for clones of two sitting Justices – Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
– if they, instead of Merrick Garland, had been nominated
by President Obama during the year 2016. Senators are
ordered by their ideological position, from liberal (left) to
conservative (right). The graphs of predicted probabilities
are not monotonically decreasing because the predictions
also take into account relative party loyalty, which is only
modestly correlated to ideological extremity. The figure
also includes 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.
Sonia Sotomayor would not gain much Republican support in the 114th Congress; just nine Republican senators
voted for her when she was confirmed in 2009, although
that includes Susan Collins, Lamar Alexander, and Lindsey
Graham. Perhaps more surprisingly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
would not gain much Republican support in the 114th
Congress either, despite the fact that in 1993 she earned the
support of 40 out of 43 Republicans, including Charles
Grassley, Orren Hatch, John McCain, and Mitch McConnell.
Figure 2 shows that a Ginsburg clone would be more likely
to receive support from moderate Republican senators than
a Sotomayor clone, due to her higher qualifications and less
liberal reputation, yet the president’s partisan label is so
important in the present regime that no Republican senator
is predicted to vote for any Obama nominee. Indeed, if we
extrapolated the analysis to imagine Obama hypothetically
nominating a clone of Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy,
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Table 2. Selected senators’ ideological positions, party loyalty levels, and predicted votes.
Last name (party)

Carper (D)
Heitkamp (D)
McCaskill (D)
Donnelly (D)
Manchin (D)
Collins (R)
Murkowski* (R)
Capito (R)
Kirk* (R)
Cochran (R)
Alexander (R)
Grassley* (R)
Hoeven* (R)
Ayotte* (R)
Coats* (R)
Portman* (R)
McCain* (R)
Wicker (R)
Corker (R)
Hatch (R)
Boozman* (R)
Moran* (R)

DW-Nominate
Common Space

Party loyalty
(114th Congress)

Predicted vote on very qualified (Q = .97) nominee
President Obama
ideal point
(N = −.366)

Justice Kennedy
ideal point
(N = +.106)

Senator Kirk
ideal point
(N = +.275)

−.178
−.170
−.150
−.124
−.070
.100
.203
.259
.275
.286
.325
.341
.343
.356
.372
.378
.379
.380
.385
.386
.404
.405

87
71
78
72
63
63
78
87
70
90
84
96
94
74
94
84
90
96
88
90
99
92

100.0 %
99.9
100.0
99.9
99.7
28.9
18.9
14.0
17.8
12.2
12.0
8.9
9.2
12.9
8.2
9.8
8.7
7.7
8.8
8.5
6.5
7.5

100.0 %
99.9
100.0
99.9
99.8
40.9
34.0
29.7
36.3
28.1
29.6
24.8
25.5
32.7
24.8
28.3
26.0
23.9
26.6
25.8
22.2
24.6

100.0 %
99.8
99.9
99.8
99.7
39.1
34.2
30.9
37.9
29.7
32.0
27.3
28.0
35.8
27.7
31.5
29.2
26.9
29.9
29.1
25.6
28.1

*denotes Republican senator whose seat is up for election in 2016.

Figure 2. Republican senators’ predicted probabilities of voting for hypothetical nominees.
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or even Chief Justice John Roberts, our model still predicts
zero Republican votes in favor of the nominee during the
114th Congress.12

in 2016 might significantly reshape their voting calculus in
a predictable yet unprecedented way.
Authors’ Note

Discussion and conclusions
With Antonin Scalia’s passing, President Obama was presented with an opportunity to name a third Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. The Segal model theorizes
that ideological distance and qualifications are the primary
determinants of senators’ votes on Supreme Court nominees, and so by naming a moderate and exceptionally well
qualified nominee, Obama could attract sufficient
Republican votes to guarantee confirmation. This expectation is naïve given the current politics. With the Senate’s
present composition, a successful confirmation requires
that there be zero Democratic defections, and at least four
Republicans plus two Independents must support the nominee. With partisan cohesion in the Senate at unprecedentedly high levels, Obama faces little risk of losing any
Democratic votes, but gaining Republican votes seems
unlikely, no matter how much political capital13 the
President spends on the nominee.
By accounting for a more nuanced and refined understanding of the confirmation process, the party loyalty
model reveals that any candidate that President Obama
could select, whether liberal, conservative, or moderate,
would be rejected if a vote was allowed to take place. So
why nominate anyone at all?
Our model of senators’ political calculus incorporates
the nominee’s qualifications and ideology, the president’s
political strength, the Senate’s partisan environment, and
each senator’s party loyalty and ideological position. What
is missing from the political calculus is the senator’s beliefs
about the election, including their own prospects for reelection, their party’s prospects of holding the Senate
majority after the election, and their presidential candidate’s prospects for victory. So few nominations take place
during the election year that it would be infeasible to incorporate electoral effects into the empirical model. For now,
these factors must remain part of the disturbance term – i.e.
factors that affect the probability of voting for the nominee
that are unmeasured and/or idiosyncratic.14 The results we
computed in Table 2 and Figure 2 capture the systematic
component of the data; Obama’s hope for a successful confirmation must come from the stochastic component, that
is, from outside the traditional decision-making calculus.
As the election approaches, un-modeled factors might
affect Republican senators’ choices. Swing-state senators
may sense potential electoral advantage from casting a vote
against partisan gridlock; or, all senators might concede
that the post-election environment will be worse than the
status quo, if Hillary Clinton is the likely victor and if she
is likely to have long coattails. The fact that 10 of the 17
Republican senators listed in Table 2 are up for re-election

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 2014 Southern
Political Science Association Meeting, on the panel: The Limits of
Executive Power.
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Notes
1. Ironically, three of the next four nominees were defeated; see
Silverstein (2007).
2. The “same-party” dummy variable is coded equal to 1 if the
senator belongs to the same party as the president, and coded
equal to 0 otherwise.
3. Our final measure is a nominee’s lack of qualifications, calculated by subtracting Segal and Cover’s (1989) qualification score from 1.
4. The measure of “ideological distance” is calculated by squaring the difference between each nominee’s and each senator’s
Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores. To place the nominee and senators on the same scale, we regress the nominating
president’s Common Space score on the nominee’s Segal–
Cover score whenever the president’s party held the Senate
majority. Next, we use the regression coefficients to predict
nominees’ Common Space scores using the linear equation:
Common Space score = .43457 – .89968(Segal–Cover score).
Due to concerns about the scaling of the first dimension during
the “Conservative Coalition” years, we replicated the analysis
in Table 1 using ideal point estimates generated by Michael
Bailey. With the exception of consistently smaller coefficients
for ideology, due to a wider scale of ideal points, our results were
largely robust. An appendix provides a comparison of models,
with discussion. It is available online at: http://uh.academia.
edu/ScottBasinger/Research-on-Judicial-Appointments.
5. De Marchi et al. opine: “The relative merits of competing
theories about the data-generating process should be determined by an out-of-sample comparison of model fit” (2004:
372). Out-of-sample validation is a defense against overfitting; see DeMarchi (2005).
6. Thirty-one Republicans voted against Sotomayor, while nine
Republicans voted for her confirmation; all 57 Democrats
plus two Independents voted for Sotomayor’s confirmation.
36 Republicans and one Democrat voted against Kagan, while
five Republicans voted for her confirmation; 56 Democrats
plus two Independents voted for Kagan’s confirmation.
7. Similarly, Basinger and Mak (2010) incorporated mean party
loyalty into an analysis of obstruction of federal judicial
nominees at the district and circuit court levels.
8. We compute average party loyalty for each Congress, averaging senators’ raw party loyalty scores; we then mean-center
average party loyalty by subtracting 78.18.
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9. We compute relative party loyalty for each senator by subtracting average party loyalty in that Congress from the senator’s raw party loyalty score.
10. Although Angus King and Bernard Sanders are officially
Independents, we group them with Democrats for calculating average and relative party loyalty.
11. The party loyalty model’s out-of-sample forecasts have an
average forecasting error of five yea/nay votes for each confirmation. Out-of-sample forecasts failed to accurately predict the outcomes of three nominations (Haynsworth, Bork,
and Thomas) of the 43 in the sample.
12. This prediction conflicts directly with the analysis of
Cameron et al. (2013) as highlighted by Cameron and
Kastellec (2016). The latter claim that hypothetical nominees who are ideologically more conservative than Breyer
but more liberal than Kennedy could earn in excess of 50
votes in the current Senate; ideological clones of Earl Warren
or Potter Stewart should earn in excess of 60 votes according
to their model.
13. See Johnson and Roberts (2004).
14. Another factor that we must leave to the error term is public
opinion on the nominee. Research by Kastellec et al. (2010)
has tied senators’ votes to public opinion, showing that senators are more likely to vote for a nominee—holding all other
factors in the Segal model constant—when voters in their
own state view the nominee more favorably. Survey data on
support for Merrick Garland are not presently available.
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